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Abstract—In this paper we analyze the secrecy capacity of a half-
duplex energy harvesting (EH)-based multi-antenna amplify-and-
forward (AF) relay network in the presence of a passive eavesdrop-
per. During the first phase, while the source is in transmission mode,
the legitimate destination transmits an auxiliary artificial noise (AN)
signal which has here two distinct purposes, a) to transfer power
to the relay b) to improve system security. Since the AN is known
at the legitimate destination, it is easily canceled at the intended
destination which is not the case at the eavesdropper. In this respect,
we derive new exact analytical expressions for the ergodic secrecy
capacity for various well-known EH relaying protocols, namely, time
switching relaying (TSR), power splitting relaying (PSR) and ideal
relaying receiver (IRR). Monte Carlo simulations are also provided
throughout our investigations to validate the analysis. The impacts of
some important system parameters such as EH time, power splitting
ratio, relay location, AN power, EH efficiency and the number of
relay antennas, on the system performance are investigated. The
results reveal that the PSR protocol generally outperforms the TSR
approach in terms of the secrecy capacity.
Index Terms—Amplify-and-forward relays, cooperative communi-
cations, energy harvesting, secrecy capacity, wireless power transfer.
I. INTRODUCTION
RADIO frequency (RF) energy harvesting (EH) in wirelesscommunications has recently attracted considerable atten-
tion which becomes particularly more attractive in applications
where battery-limited devices are not easily accessible, and
replacing or recharging their batteries is inconvenient, costly
and/or unsafe such as devices embedded inside human bodies
and wireless sensors operating under dangerous conditions. This
solution is based on the fact that RF signals can concurrently carry
information and energy, hence allowing energy constrained nodes
to simultaneously harvest energy and process information. This
is referred to as simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) [1]–[5]. Motivated by this, nodes in future
wireless networks are envisioned to be energy self-sufficient and
more sustainable by harvesting RF signals from the surrounding
environment.
The concept of SWIPT was first developed in [1], where a
tradeoff between the rates at which energy and reliable informa-
tion can be transmitted over a single noisy channel was studied.
Later on, this work was extended in [2] to incorporate the effect of
frequency-selective channels and additive white Gaussian noise.
However, these studies assumed ideal receiver conditions which
means that decoding information and extracting power can be
obtained simultaneously from the same received signal. This
assumption appears unrealistic in practice due to practical circuit
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design limitations. On the other hand, the authors in [3], [6]
introduced two practical EH receivers, namely, time switching
(TS) and power splitting (PS). In the former, the receiver switches
between the energy harvester and information receiver whereas in
the latter scheme, the receiver splits the signal into two streams,
one for EH and the other for information decoding1.
Similar to wireless information signals, power transfer effi-
ciency in SWIPT systems is subject to channel fading and, there-
fore, multi-antenna and cooperative communication techniques
can be exploited to further enhance the efficiency of such systems
[6], [7]. For instance, the authors in [8] considered the throughput
of a single-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying system
with an energy-constrained relay which solely relies on harvesting
energy from the received RF signal. In this work, two EH
relaying protocols are proposed namely, time switching relaying
(TSR) and power splitting relaying (PSR). In [9] different power
allocation strategies for EH decode-and-forward (DF) relaying
networks with multiple source-destination pairs were investigated.
Furthermore, an EH relaying system was studied in [10] for
the cases with/without the presence of co-channel interference
where the multiple antennas relay node is powered by the source
signal and signals from other sources. In [11] harvest-and-forward
strategy was proposed to enhance the achievable rate in multi-
antenna relay channels. In this strategy, the relay harvests energy
and receives information signal simultaneously based on antenna
selection (AS) and power splitting (PS) techniques, then the
relay amplifies and forwards the processed information using
the harvested energy. For more details, we refer the reader to
[12] where the basic concepts of SWIPT was discussed and the
application of advanced smart antenna technologies to SWIPT
was investigated.
Moreover, recently, there has been an growing interest in
studying physical layer security in SWIPT systems. The concept
of physical layer security was first developed by Wyner in [13]
where it was shown that secret communication is possible when
the eavesdropper channel is a degraded version of the destination
channel. For instance, cooperative jamming aided secure commu-
nication for SWIPT networks was studied in [14], [15], where the
jamming signal is used to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel and
help the source to increase the harvested energy by the energy
receiver. The authors of [16] proposed a harvest-and-jam (HJ)
protocol in a SWIPT cooperative system consisting of four relay
node wiretap channels with multi-antenna HJ helpers to maximize
the secrecy rate subject to the relay transmit power constraint and
the total harvested energy for each jamming helper. In addition,
different secure relay beam-forming algorithms for SWIPT non-
regenerative relay systems were studied in [17].
1In practice, PS is based on a power splitter and TS requires a simpler switcher.
2Unlike the existing work on this topic, in this paper we analyze
the performance of a multi-antenna energy-constrained AF relay
network in the context of physical layer security. Three most
common EH relaying schemes are considered in this paper,
namely TSR, PSR and IRR. Although there have been many
physical layer security jamming schemes with different degrees of
effectiveness and complexity, in this paper we consider the well-
known self-back interference scheme in which the destination
transmits artificial noise (AN) to confuse the eavesdropper [18],
[19]. To elaborate, the end-to-end communication is accomplished
over two phases. In phase I, while the source transmits its
information signal, the legitimate destination also broadcasts an
AN signal; during this phase the relay harvests energy from the
two different sources. In phase II, however, the relay combines the
two received signals and, using the harvested energy, amplifies
and forwards this signal. Since the legitimate destination has
perfect knowledge of the AN, unlike the illegitimate nodes, it
can easily and accurately remove it.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. We first derive
analytical expressions for the ergodic secrecy capacity of the
TSR-, PSR- and IRR-based systems. Then, the optimal time
switching factor of the TSR system and the optimal power
splitting factor of PSR system that maximize the system se-
crecy capacity are determined in various scenarios. In all our
investigations, Monte Carlo simulations are provided to confirm
our analysis. Furthermore, the impacts of some important system
parameters such as the EH time, power splitting ratio, source-to-
relay distance, AN power, EH efficiency and the number of relay
antennas, on the adopted performance metrics are investigated.
Results show that the good selection of the time switching and
the power splitting factors are the key for achieving best secrecy
capacity. Also, increasing the AN power, the number of the
relay antennas, the source-to-relay distance and/or the source-
to-eavesdropper distance can enhance the secrecy capacity of the
proposed system.
We focus our study in this paper on the physical layer secu-
rity in SWIPT systems for the following main reasons. Firstly,
cryptography techniques, which are also used to achieve secure
communication, need secure channels between the legitimate
nodes to exchange a private key. Secondly, the jamming signal,
which is conventionally used to increase security, is also exploited
here to boost the energy harvesting process, this idea is very
interesting and worth investigating.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe
the system model. Sections III, IV and V derive analytical
expressions for the ergodic secrecy capacity of the TSR-, PSR-
and IRR-based systems, respectively. Numerical examples and
simulation results are presented and discussed in section VI.
Finally, Section VII outlines the main conclusions of this work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model under consideration is shown in Fig. 1
which is based on a two-hop relaying network consisting of
a single-antenna source node sending information signals to a
single-antenna destination node through N -antenna AF relay in
the presence of a single-antenna passive eavesdropper. On one
hand, the source and destination transmit information and noise
signals with a fixed transmission power supply denoted as Ps
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Figure 1: System model with multi-antenna relay.
and Pd, respectively. On the other hand, the relay is an EH node
which solely relies on its RF harvested energy, Eh, to amplify and
forward the received signal2. The channel coefficients between
the nodes are denoted as shown in Fig. 1, where h1 is the
N × 1 source-to-relay channel vector, h2 is the 1 × N relay-
to-destination channel vector, g1 is 1× 1 source-to-eavesdropper
channel, g2 is 1× 1 destination-to-eavesdropper channel and g3
is 1 × N relay-to-eavesdropper channel vector; all the channels
are modeled as quasi-static block fading channels, i.e. channels
remain constant over block time T and vary independently and
identically from one block to another, following a Rayleigh
distribution. The distances from the source to relay, relay to
destination, source to eavesdropper, destination to eavesdropper
and relay to eavesdropper nodes are represented by d1, d2, d3,
d4 and d5, respectively.
It is assumed that all communications are performed through
the relaying node and that there is no direct link between the
source and destination due to the deep shadowing. Therefore,
the communication between the source and destination is accom-
plished over two phases. In phase I, the relay simultaneously
receives the information signal from the source and AN from
the destination, both of which are used by the relay to harvest
energy. During phase II, using the RF harvested energy, the
relay amplifies and forwards the received signal to the intended
destination. Due to the symmetry of time division systems, the
forward and the backward channels are symmetric. It is also
assumed that
• The channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is
unknown at the legitimate nodes.
• The eavesdropper does not have any knowledge of the
channels between the legitimate nodes.
• The relay has full CSI of the main channels, i.e. source-to-
relay and relay-to-destination links.
• There is perfect synchronization between the nodes and
that the destination has perfect knowledge of the system
parameters, e.g. channel gains and distances. Therefore,
the AN power can always be adaptively controlled by the
legitimate destination as required [20].
2The EH protocol at the relay is harvest-use based, i.e. there is no energy
storage or rechargeable batteries at the relay and all the harvested energy is
used instantly. It is worth mentioning that having storage capability will enable
the node to store energy whenever the harvested energy is more than that of
the node’s consumption, which of course could considerably enhance the overall
performance.
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Figure 2: TSR protocol for EH and information signal processing at the relay.
To measure the security level of a communication network, the
secrecy capacity, Cs, is usually considered which is basically de-
fined by the maximum difference between the mutual information
of the main and eavesdropper channels [21]. The secrecy capacity
Cs of a wiretap channel, has the following form [21]
Cs = max [I (x; y)− I (x; z)]+ (1)
where [l]+= max (0, l), x is the input signal at the source, y
and z are the output signals at the destination and eavesdropper,
respectively. In addition, the ergodic secrecy capacity can be
obtained based on the knowledge of the CSI at the transmitter as
follow [22]
1- When the channel gains of both the legitimate destination
(S-D) hsd and the eavesdropper (S-E) hse are known at the
transmitter, the ergodic secrecy capacity is given by [22, Eq(4)]
[21, Eq(2.31)]
C¯s1 = max
P (hsd,hse)
E
[
[Cd − Ce]+
]
(2)
where Cd and Ce are the destination and eavesdropper capacities,
respectively.
2- When only the channel gain of the legitimate destination is
known at the transmitter, the ergodic secrecy capacity is given by
[22, Eq(8)] [21, Eq(2.33)]
C¯s2 = max
P (hsd)
E
[
[Cd − Ce]+
]
(3)
3- When the transmitter does not have any knowledge of both
the main and eavesdropper channels (only destination CSI). The
ergodic secrecy capacity in this case is given by [22, page 4692]
[23, Eq(5)]
C¯s3 = [E (Cd)− E (Ce)]+ (4)
Of course, the secrecy capacity in the first case is larger than those
in the second and the third cases, i.e., the secrecy capacity in the
third case is the lower bound of the first case, C¯s1 > C¯s2 > C¯s3.
In this paper we assume that the destination has full state
information of the main channel, and the ergodic secrecy capacity
C¯s is derived based on (4), where Cd and Ce are given by
Cd =
1
2 log2 (1 + γd) and Ce =
1
2 log2 (1 + γe), respectively,
whereas γd and γe denote the corresponding signal-to-noise
ratios (SNRs). Therefore, the expression (4) implies that when
the destination SNR is greater than that of the eavesdropper,
the secrecy capacity will be the difference between the two
channel capacities; otherwise, the secrecy capacity is zero. In the
following, we derive the ergodic secrecy capacity for the three
considered EH-based systems.
III. TIME SWITCHING RELAYING (TSR) PROTOCOL
In this protocol, as shown in Fig. 2, the time required to
transmit a certain block from the source to the destination is
T . The relay however harvests energy from the received signal
for only a period of αT where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Half of the remaining
time, (1− α)T/2, is used for phase I and the other remaining
half, (1− α)T/2, is used for phase II. It is assumed that all the
harvested energy during αT is used by the relay to forward the
received signal3. To elaborate, in phase I, the received signal at
the relay node can be given as
yr =
√
Ps
dm1
h1s+
√
Pd
dm2
h2υ + na (5)
where Ps is the source transmitted power, s is the information
signal normalized such that E
[
|s|2
]
= 1, Pd is the destination
transmitted power, υ is the AN signal coming from the legitimate
destination, and E
[
|υ|2
]
= 1, m is the path loss exponent and na
is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector introduced
by the receiver antennas at the relay, i.e. na ∼ CN
(
0, σ2aIN
)
.
During αT the harvested energy by the EH receiver is given by
[3]
Eh = η αT
[
Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + Pd
dm2
‖h2‖2 +Nσ2a
]
(6)
where 0 < η < 1 is the EH efficiency factor which depends
mainly on the EH circuitry and ‖.‖ denotes Euclidean norm. After
the base-band processing at the information receiver, the relay
output signal before amplification can be expressed as
yr =
√
Ps
dm1
h1s+
√
Pd
dm2
h2υ + nr (7)
where nr is an N × 1 AWGN vector at the relay, i.e. nr ∼
CN (0, σ2rIN), nr = na + nc and nc is the noise vector
introduced by the information receiver, i.e. nc ∼ CN
(
0, σ2cIN
)
[8], [11]. Furthermore, the received signal at the eavesdropper in
the first phase is given by
y(1)e =
√
Ps
dm3
g1s+
√
Pd
dm4
g2υ + ne (8)
3In other words, the energy consumed by the relay circuitry to process the
information signals is negligible in this study.
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Figure 3: PSR protocol for EH and information signal processing at the relay.
where ne is the AWGN signal at the eavesdropper with variance
σ2e , i.e., ne ∼ CN
(
0, σ2e
)
. In phase II, the relay transmitted
signal, xr, can be written as
xr = Gyr (9)
where G is the relay gain given by
G =
√
Prβt. (10)
Here, Pr is the relay transmit power and
βt =
1
Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + Pddm2 ‖h2‖
2
+Nσ2r
. (11)
Consequently, the received signal at the destination is
yd =
√
PsPrβt
dm1 d
m
2
h2h1 s
+
√
PdPrβt
d2m2
h2h
†
2 υ +
√
Prβt
dm2
h2nr + nd , (12)
where nd is the AWGN signal at the destination with variance
σ2d, i.e. nd ∼ CN
(
0, σ2d
)
and † denotes the transpose operation.
However, since the AN is known at the legitimate destination and
full system information is available at the destination, υ can be
easily removed at the destination; hence, yd can be simplified to
yd =
√
PsPrβt
dm1 d
m
2
h2h1 s+
√
Prβt
dm2
h2nr + nd. (13)
On the other hand, the eavesdropper received signal is given
as [20]
y(2)e =
√
PsPrβt
dm1 d
m
5
g3h1 s+
√
PdPrβt
dm2 d
m
5
g3h
†
2 υ+
√
Prβt
dm5
g3nr+ne.
(14)
Now, the relay transmitted power Pr can be simply expressed in
terms of the harvested energy as
Pr =
Eh
(1− α)T/2 (15)
and substituting the value of Eh in (6) into (15) yields
Pr =
2 η α
(1− α)
[
Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + Pd
dm2
‖h2‖2 +Nσ2a
]
. (16)
Now, substituting (16) into (13) and (14), then grouping the
information signal and noise terms we obtain the SNR at the
destination, γd, as given by
γd =
2 η αPs |h2h1|2
2 η α dm1 σ
2
r ‖h2‖2 + (1− α) dm1 dm2 σ2d
. (17)
As we can see from (8) and (14), the eavesdropper has two
opportunities to overhear the information signal in two different
time slots. However, the eavesdropper has a limited ability to
maximize the overall SNR, as it does not have any knowledge of
the channels between the legitimate nodes.
Considering the worst case scenario in which the eavesdropper
can know the systems’ channels. Strictly speaking, in this case the
eavesdropper can perform any technique with the signals received
in the two phases in order to maximize the overall SNR. In
this paper, in order to examine the efficiency of the proposed
schemes, we study a simple case in which the eavesdropper
performs maximal ratio combining (MRC) 4. According to MRC,
the eavesdropper combines the received signals by multiplying (8)
and (14) with factors w1 and w2, respectively, as given by [24],
[25]
ye = w1y
(1)
e + w2y
(2)
e (18)
where w1 =
√
Ps
dm3
gH1
Pd
dm4
|g2|2+σ2e
and w2 =√
PsPrβt
dm1 d
m
5
hH1 g
H
3
PdPrβt
dm2 d
m
5
|g3h2|2+Prβtdm5 σ
2
r‖g3‖2+σ2e
, while (.)H is the transpose
conjugate operation. From (18) we can get the SNR at the
eavesdropper γe as given by (19), shown at the top of the next
page.
The ergodic secrecy capacity of this system can be obtained
as
C¯ [TSR]s =
[
E
[
CTSRd
]− E [CTSRe ]]+ . (20)
According to the best of the authors knowledge, the simplest
form of E
[
CTSRd
]
and E
[
CTSRe
]
can be written respectively
as in (21) and (22), shown at the top of the next page, where
M
γ
(1)
e
(z), MTSR
γ
(2)
e
(z) are given by (23) and (24), also shown at
the top of the next page, and a1 = 2 η αPs, b1 = 2 η α dm1 σ
2
r ,
4Please note that, in the system model there is no a direct (S-D) link, so we
can increase the system security in this case by forcing the transmitter to transmit
a jamming signal in the second phase.
5γe =
Psd
m
4 |g1|2
Pddm3 |g2|2 + dm3 dm4 σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
(1)
e
+
2 η αPsd
m
2 |g3 h1|2
2 η α dm1 Pd
∣∣∣g3h†2∣∣∣2 + 2 η α dm1 dm2 σ2r ‖g3‖2 + (1− α) dm1 dm2 dm5 σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
(2)
e
. (19)
c1 = (1− α) dm1 dm2 σ2d, a2 = 2 η αPsdm2 , b2 = 2 η α d
m
1 Pd
2 η αPsdm2
, c2 =
2 η α dm1 d
m
2 σ
2
r
2 η αPsdm2
, r = (1−α) d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
5 σ
2
e
2 η αPsdm2
and b3 =
Pdd
m
3
Psdm4
, c3 =
dm3 σ
2
e
Ps
.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
IV. POWER SPLITTING RELAYING (PSR) PROTOCOL
In this protocol the time required to transmit a certain block
from the source to the destination T is divided into two equal
durations, i.e. T/2, as illustrated in Fig. 3. During the first
half time block T/2, the relay harvests energy and process
information, and a fraction of the received signal power, ρP ,
at the relay is allocated for EH and the remaining received
power, (1− ρ)P , is used for the information processing, where
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. In the second T/2 time block, the relay uses the
harvested energy to amplify and forward the received signal to
the intended destination. As for phase I, the received signal at
the EH receiver can be expressed as
yr =
√
ρPs
dm1
h1s+
√
ρPd
dm2
h2υ +
√
ρna. (25)
The energy harvested by the EH receiver is given by [3]
Eh =
η ρ T
2
[
Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + Pd
dm2
‖h2‖2 +Nσ2a
]
. (26)
and the signal at the information receiver output can be expressed
by
yr =
√
(1− ρ)Ps
dm1
h1s+
√
(1− ρ)Pd
dm2
h2υ + nr (27)
where nr =
√
1− ρna + nc. Now, the received signal at the
eavesdropper in the first phase can be written as
y(1)e =
√
Ps
dm3
g1s+
√
Pd
dm4
g2υ + ne (28)
In phase II, the relay transmits the following signal
xr = Gyr (29)
where G represents the relay gain given by
G =
√
Prβp (30)
Pr is the relay power and βp is given by
βp =
1
(1−ρ)Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + (1−ρ)Pddm2 ‖h2‖
2
+Nσ2r
. (31)
Now, the received signal at the destination can be written as in
(32).
Similar to the TSR scenario, υ can be easily removed at the
destination; hence, yd is simplified to
yd =
√
(1− ρ)PsPrβp
dm1 d
m
2
h2h1 s+
√
Prβph2√
dm2
nr + nd. (33)
On the other hand, the eavesdropper received signal is given
as
y(2)e =
√
(1− ρ)PsPrβp
dm1 d
m
5
g3 h1 s
+
√
(1− ρ)PdPrβp√
dm2 d
m
5
g3h
†
2 υ +
√
Prβpg3√
dm5
nr + ne. (34)
The relay transmitted power in terms of the harvested energy
is obtained as
Pr =
Eh
T/2
. (35)
Using (26), Pr can be expressed as
Pr = η ρ
[
Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + Pd
dm2
‖h2‖2 +Nσ2a
]
. (36)
Substituting (36) into (33) and (34), then grouping the informa-
tion and noise signals, it is easy to obtained the SNR expressions
at the destination and the eavesdropper nodes as given by (37)
and (38), respectively.
The ergodic secrecy capacity of the PSR system is given as
C¯ [PSR]s =
[
E
[
CPSRd
]− E [CPSRe ]]+ (39)
while E
[
CPSRd
]
and E
[
CPSRd
]
are given by (40) and (41),
respectively, where M
γ
(1)
e
(z) is given by (23) and MPSR
γ
(2)
e
(z)
is given by (42), and
a1 = η ρ (1− ρ)Ps, (43a)
b1 = η ρ d
m
1 σ
2
c , (43b)
c1 = η ρ (1− ρ) dm1 σ2a, (43c)
r1 = (1− ρ) dm1 dm2 σ2d, (43d)
a2 = η ρ (1− ρ)Psdm2 , (43e)
b2 = η ρ (1− ρ) dm1 Pd/a2, (43f)
c2 = η ρ (1− ρ) dm1 dm2 σ2a/a2, (43g)
r2 = η ρ d
m
1 d
m
2 σ
2
c/a2, and (43h)
ω = (1− ρ) dm1 dm2 dm5 σ2e/a2, (43i)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
6E
[
CTSRd
]
=
1− α
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1− λx
λx + a1z
)
2 e−zb1 (c1z)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
c1z) (z) dz. (21)
E
[
CTSRe
]
=
1− α
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1−M
γ
(1)
e
(z)MTSR
γ
(2)
e
(z)
)
e−zdz. (22)
M
γ
(1)
e
(z) = 1−
zλg2e
λg2
b3
(c3+z)
[
Γ
(
0,
λg2
b3
(c3 + z)
)
+ ln
(
b3
λg2
)
− ln (c3 + z) + ln
(
λg2
b3
(c3 + z)
)]
b3
(23)
MTSR
γ
(2)
e
(z) = 1− z
∞ˆ
0
e−zq
λΥ
λΥ + (b2 ∗ q) .e
−qc2 .
2 (r q)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
r q) dq. (24)
yd =
√
(1− ρ)PsPrβp
dm1 d
m
2
h2h1 s+
√
(1− ρ)PdPrβp
d2m2
h2h
†
2 υ +
√
Prβph2√
dm2
nr + nd. (32)
γd =
η ρ (1− ρ)Ps |h2h1|2
η ρ dm1 σ
2
c ‖h2‖2 + η ρ (1− ρ) dm1 σ2a ‖h2‖2 + (1− ρ) dm1 dm2 σ2d
. (37)
γe =
Psd
m
4 |g1|2
Pddm3 |g2|2 + dm3 dm4 σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
(1)
e
+
η ρ (1− ρ)Psdm2 |g3h1|2
η ρ (1− ρ) dm1 Pd
∣∣∣g3h†2∣∣∣2 + η ρ (1− ρ) dm1 dm2 σ2a ‖g3‖2 + η ρ dm1 dm2 σ2c ‖g3‖2 + (1− ρ) dm1 dm2 dm5 σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
(2)
e
.
(38)
V. IDEAL RELAY RECEIVER
Unlike the TSR and PSR systems, the IRR system has the capa-
bility to independently and concurrently process the information
signal and harvest energy from the same received signal5. There-
fore, during the first T/2, the relay harvests energy and process
information whereas in the second T/2 time block the relay uses
this harvested energy to amplify and forward the received signal,
as shown in Fig. 4. Consequently, the harvested energy and relay
transmitted power can be expressed, respectively, as
Eh =
η T
2
[
Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + Pd
dm2
‖h2‖2 +Nσ2a
]
. (44)
and
Pr =
2Eh
T
= η
[
Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + Pd
dm2
‖h2‖2 +Nσ2a
]
. (45)
The received signal at the eavesdropper in the first phase is
given by
5It should be mentioned that IRR would require two independent antenna(s)
which can be costly in practice. Additionally, as far as the current circuit designs
are concerned, it is very difficult, if not impossible, yet to extract RF energy
directly from the information signal [26].
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Figure 4: Time frame structure for IRR.
y(1)e =
√
Ps
dm3
g1s+
√
Pd
dm4
g2υ + ne (46)
In the second phase, the received signals at the destination and
eavesdropper for the IRR system can be given by
yd =
√
PsPrβi
dm1 d
m
2
h2h1 s+
√
Prβi
dm2
h2nr + nd (47)
and
7E
[
CPSRd
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1− λX
λX + (a1 ∗ z)
)
e−(b1+c1)
2 (r1 z)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
r1 z) dz. (40)
E
[
CPSRe
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1−M
γ
(1)
e
(z)MPSR
γ
(2)
e
(z)
)
e−zdz. (41)
MPSR
γ
(2)
e
(z) = 1− z
∞ˆ
0
e−zqe−q(c2+r2)
λΥ
λΥ + (b2 ∗ q)
2 (ω q)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
ω q) dq. (42)
y(2)e =
√
PsPrβi
dm1 d
m
5
g3h1 s
+
√
PdPrβi√
dm2 d
m
5
g3h
†
2 υ +
√
Prβi√
dm5
g3nr + ne (48)
respectively, where nr = na and
βi =
1
Ps
dm1
‖h1‖2 + Pddm2 ‖h2‖
2
+Nσ2r
. (49)
Substituting (45) into (47) and (48), then grouping the informa-
tion and noise terms, we get SNR expressions at the destination
and eavesdropper as in (50) and (51), respectively.
γd =
η Ps |h2h1|2
η dm1 σ
2
r ‖h2‖2 + dm1 dm2 σ2d
. (50)
Finally, the ergodic secrecy capacity of the IRR-based system
can be obtained by
C¯ [IRR]s =
[
E
[
CIRRd
]− E [CIRRe ]]+ (52)
E
[
CIRRd
]
and E
[
CIRRe
]
can be expressed as in (53) and (54),
respectively, whereM
γ
(1)
e
(z) is given by (23),M
γ
(2)
e
(z) is given
by (55) and
a1= η Ps, (56a)
b1= η d
m
1 σ
2
r , (56b)
c1= d
m
1 d
m
2 σ
2
d, (56c)
a2= η Psd
m
2 , (56d)
b2= η d
m
1 Pd/a2, (56e)
c2= η d
m
1 d
m
2 σ
2
r/a2, and (56f)
r2= d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
5 σ
2
e/a2, (56g)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
Equations (21), (22), (40), (41), (53) and (54) are exact
explicit expressions for the ergodic capacities. Furthermore, to
more clearly highlight the effect of various system parameters,
Gaussian Quadrature rule can be straightforwardly applied. For
instance (53), (54) and (55) can be rewritten as in (57), (58) and
(59), where (zi, qi) and Hi are the ith zero and the weighting
factor of the Laguerre polynomials, respectively [27].
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we present some numerical results for the math-
ematical expressions derived above and investigate the impact
of various key system parameters on the system performance.
To validate our analysis, Monte Carlo simulations with 106
independent trials are also presented throughout and in all our
evaluations the channel coefficients are randomly generated in
each simulation run. Unless otherwise stated, we set system
parameters as follows Ps = Pd = 30 dBm, η = 1, m = 2.76
and d1, d2, d3, d4 and d5 are normalized to unit value. For
simplicity, but without loss of generality, equal noise variances
are chosen at the destination and the eavesdropper nodes such
that σ2 = σ2d = σ
2
e = −10 dBm while σ2a = σ2c = σ2/2; also
λX , λY , λΦ and λΥ are all set to 1. It should also be mentioned
that the secrecy capacity integrals are efficiently evaluated using
numerical integration.
A. Effect of α and ρ on Secrecy Capacity
In this section we investigate the impact of the EH time ratio,
α, and power splitting factor, ρ, on the system performance.
Fig. 5 shows the the ergodic secrecy capacity versus α and
ρ for various values of N . The first observation one can see
from these results is that the proposed TSR and PSR always
provide better performance relative to the conventional systems,
i.e. N = 1, irrespective of the values of α and ρ. It is also
apparent that as the number of relay antennas increases the
ergodic secrecy capacity enhances and that there exists an optimal
value for α and ρ, for each number of the relay antennas N, that
maximizes the ergodic secrecy capacity. This can be justified for
each EH protocol as follows. For the TSR system, when α is
too small there is less time for EH and hence small amount of
energy is harvested which of course will result in poor secrecy
capacity. At the other extreme, when α is too large, too much
energy is harvested unnecessarily at the expense of information
transmission time which, consequently, also leads to poor secrecy
capacity. Similarly, for the PSR-based system, when ρ is too
small, there is less power for EH. As a result, less transmission
power is available at the relay, which leads to poor secrecy
capacity. On the other hand, when ρ is too large, only small
amount of power is available for the information transmission
while more power is unnecessarily wasted on the EH and hence
6This corresponds to an urban cellular network environment [28].
8γe =
Psd
m
4 |g1|2
Pddm3 |g2|2 + dm3 dm4 σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
(1)
e
+
η Psd
m
2 |g3h1|2
η dm1 Pd
∣∣∣g3h†2∣∣∣2 + η σ2r dm1 dm2 ‖g3‖2 + dm1 dm2 dm5 σ2e︸ ︷︷ ︸
γ
(2)
e
. (51)
E
[
CIRRd
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1− λX
λX + a1z
)
e−zb1
2 (c1 z)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
c1 z) dz (53)
E
[
CIRRe
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1−M
γ
(1)
e
(z)MIRR
γ
(2)
e
(z)
)
e−zdz (54)
MIRR
γ
(2)
e
(z) = 1− z
∞ˆ
0
e−zqe−qc2
λΥ
λΥ + b2q
2 (r2 q)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
r2 q) dq. (55)
E
[
CIRRd
]
≈
1
2 ln (2)
1
b1
n∑
i=1
Hi
b1
zi
(
1− λXb1
b1λX + a1zi
) 2 ( c1 zib1 )N/2
Γ (N)
KN
(
2
√
c1 zi
b1
)
(57)
lesser secrecy capacity is noticed. This phenomena is discussed
below in detail.
B. Optimized α and ρ and Maximum Achievable Cs
In this section we examine the optimal switching time/power
splitting factors (α, ρ) and the corresponding maximum achiev-
able ergodic secrecy capacity. Fig. 6a illustrates the optimal
switching time factor (α∗) and power splitting factor (ρ∗) versus
N for η = 0.3, 0.5 and 1. It should be pointed out that in this
section the solid and dashed lines represent the analytical results
whereas the simulated results are represented by markers. Having
a closer look at these results, two main observations can be
seen. First, increasing η will always reduce α∗ and ρ∗ which is
intuitive because higher η means more energy can be harvested
in shorter period of time for TSR and smaller power ratio for
PSR, i.e. smaller α and ρ are required. The second observation
is that α∗ and ρ∗ decrease with increasing the number of relay
antennas. This can be intuitively explained by the fact that having
more antennas will allow harvesting same amount of energy with
shorter period of time for TSR and smaller power ratio for PSR.
The maximum achievable ergodic secrecy capacity corresponding
to α∗ and ρ∗ is plotted in Fig. 6b with respect to N for various
values of η. In addition, results for the IRR system are shown
in this figure. It is clear that the IRR system always has better
performance relative to the TSR and PSR techniques under same
system features. It is also noted that the Cs enhances when either
η or N is increased for the same reasons mentioned previously.
C. Effect of Relay Location, Eavesdropper Location and AN
Power
In order to investigate the impact of the relay location, the
eavesdropper location and the AN power on the secrecy capacity
of the TSR- and PSR-based systems, we consider a simple one-
dimensional model as illustrated in Fig. 7, the source and the
destination are located at (0, 0) m and (10, 0) m, respectively.
The channels between the nodes are modeled by line-of-sight
model including the path loss effect. It is assumed that the
distance between the relay antennas is much smaller than the
distance between the relay and the destination, eavesdropper and
source nodes7. Hence, the path losses between the different relay
antennas and the other nodes are the same.
Firstly, the eavesdropper are placed at (7.5, 0) m away from
the source (0, 0) m while the relay position is varied from (0, 0)
m to (7.5, 0) m. In this respect, Fig. 8 depicts a 3D surface plot
for the ergodic secrecy capacity as a function of d1 and Pd for
both the TSR- and PSR-based EH techniques when α and ρ are
optimized. System parameters adopted in this section are N = 8,
η = 1 and Ps = 2 W. In this section the solid lines represent the
analytical results whereas the simulated results are represented by
circles. The common observation one can see in the two systems
is that the optimal secrecy capacity is at its minimum when the
relay is exactly at the source node and improves as the relay
moves towards the destination. This is because when the relay is
far away from the destination, the AN signal at the relay will be
too weak to protect the information source signal in phase II.
Secondly, the relay are placed at (5, 0) m away from the source
(0, 0) m while the eavesdropper position is varied from (1, 0) m
7This is a common assumption in the analysis of relay networks.
9E
[
CIRRe
]
≈
1
2 ln (2)
n∑
i=1
Hi
1
zi
(
1−M
γ
(1)
e
(zi)MIRRγ(2)e (zi)
)
(58)
MIRR
γ
(2)
e
(z) = 1− z
c2
n∑
i=1
Hie
− zqic2 c2λΥ
c2λΥ + b2qi
2
(
r2 qi
c2
)N/2
Γ (N)
KN
(
2
√
r2 qi
c2
)
. (59)
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Figure 5: Ergodic secrecy capacity with respect to α and ρ for the TSR- and PSR-based systems with various values of N .
to (7.5, 0) m. Fig. 9 represents a 3D surface plot for the ergodic
secrecy capacity as a function of d3 and Pd for both the TSR- and
PSR-based EH techniques when α and ρ are optimized for the
same system parameters. From this figure we can observe that, the
optimal secrecy capacity is at its minimum when the eavesdropper
is closed to the source node and enhances as the eavesdropper
moves towards the destination. This can be justified by the fact
that when the eavesdropper is far away from the destination, the
AN signal strength at the eavesdropper in phase I will be too
weak due to larger path loss.
Finally, from the two figures 8 and 9, it is clear that increasing
the AN power will enhance the system secrecy capacity in both
TSR- and PSR-based systems but it is more obvious in the former
scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the secrecy capacity in energy-
constrained AF relay networks when the relay is equipped with
multiple antennas. The analysis considered three EH relaying
protocols, namely, TSR, PSR and IRR. In each case, we have
derived accurate analytical expressions for the ergodic secrecy
capacity. Also the time switching and power splitting factors
were optimized to maximize the secrecy capacity in various
system configurations. The results demonstrated that increasing
the number of relay antennas can reduce the time switching and
power splitting factors while maximizing the ergodic secrecy
capacity. Furthermore, increasing the AN power as well as the
source-to-relay distance and/or source-to-eavesdropper distance
can considerably enhance the secrecy capacity performance.
APPENDIX A
This appendix derives the destination and eavesdropper ergodic
capacities for the TSR-based system.
• Destination Ergodic Capacity
To begin with, it is more convenient to rewrite the destination
ergodic capacity in (17) as follows
γd =
a1
|h2h1|2
‖h2‖2
b1 +
c1
‖h2‖2
=
X
b1 + Y
(60)
where a1 = 2 η αPs, b1 = 2 η α dm1 σ
2
r , c1 = (1− α) dm1 dm2 σ2d,
X = a1
|h2h1|2
‖h2‖2 and Y =
c1
‖h2‖2 . Consequently, we can get
E
[
CTSRd
]
=
1− α
2
E
[
log2
(
1 +
X
b1 + Y
)]
. (61)
It is presented in [29] that for any random variables u, v > 0
E
[
ln
(
1 +
u
v
)]
=
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(Mv (z)−Mv+u (z)) dz (62)
where Mv (z) denotes the moment generating function (MGF)
of v defined as
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Figure 6: Optimal values of α and ρ with the corresponding maximum achievable ergodic secrecy capacity versus the number of relay antennas for the TSR,
PSR and IRR based systems with various values of η (stars represent simulation results).
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Figure 7: The system configuration used to highlight the impact of relay location, eavesdropper location and AN on the system secrecy capacity.
Mv (z) =
∞ˆ
−∞
e−zv f (v) dv (63)
where f (v) is the probability density function. Using this defini-
tion in (62), and since X and Y are independent [30], (61) can
be rewritten as
E
[
CTSRd
]
=
1− α
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−MX (z))Mb1+Y (z) dz (64)
Because X has exponential distribution with parameter λx > 0
[30], its MGF is
MX (z) = λx
λx + a1z
. (65)
In addition, ‖h2‖2 has chi-square distribution, hence the MGF
of b1 + Y can be given by [31]
Mb1+Y (z) =
2 e−zb1 (c1z)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
c1z) (66)
where Γ (.) is the Gamma function and KN (.) is the N th order
modified Bessel function of the second kind [27]. Substituting
(65) and (66) into (64) yields (21).
• Eavesdropper Ergodic Capacity
Similarly, we now calculate the ergodic capacity at the eaves-
dropper by first simplifying (19) to
γ(1)e =
Psd
m
4 |g1|2
Pddm3 |g2|2 + dm3 dm4 σ2e
=
|g1|2
b3 |g2|2 + c3
(67)
and
γ(2)e =
|g3 h1|2
‖g3‖2
b2
|g3h†2|2
‖g3‖2 + c2 +
r
‖g3‖2
=
Φ
Υ + c2 + ζ
(68)
where b3 =
Pdd
m
3
Psdm4
, c3 =
dm3 d
m
4 σ
2
e
Psdm4
, b2 =
2 η α dm1 Pd
2 η αPsdm2
, c2 =
2 η α dm1 d
m
2 σ
2
r
2 η αPsdm2
, r = (1−α) d
m
1 d
m
2 d
m
5 σ
2
e
2 η αPsdm2
, Φ = |g3 h1|
2
‖g3‖2 , Υ = b2
|g3h†2|2
‖g3‖2
and ζ = r‖g3‖2 . Using these definitions, the ergodic capacity at
the eavesdropper for the TSR can now be expressed as
E
[
CTSRe
]
=
1− α
2
E
[
log2
(
1 +
|g1|2
b3 |g2|2 + c3
+
Φ
Υ + c2 + ζ
)]
(69)
From [29], we can rewrite (69) as
E
[
CTSRe
]
=
1− α
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1−M
γ
(1)
e
(z)MTSR
γ
(2)
e
(z)
)
e−zdz.
(70)
where M
γ
(1)
e
(z) is the MGF of γ(1)e and MTSR
γ
(2)
e
(z) is the MGF
of γ(2)e . To derive MGF of γ
(1)
e , we start with
M
γ
(1)
e
(z) =
∞ˆ
0
e−zγf
γ
(1)
e
(γ) dγ (71)
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Figure 8: A 3D surface plot for the optimal secrecy capacity as a function of the source-to-destination distance and AN power for the TSR- and PSR-based
systems. Circles represent simulated results.
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Figure 9: A 3D surface plot for the optimal secrecy capacity as a function of the source-to-eavesdropper distance and AN power for the TSR- and PSR-based
systems. Circles represent simulated results.
Using integration by parts, we can get
M
γ
(1)
e
(z) = 1− z
∞ˆ
0
e−zγMb3|g2|2+c3 (γ) dγ (72)
Mb3|g2|2+c3 is found as [31]
Mb3|g2|2+c3 (γ) =M|g2|2 (b3γ) e−γ c3 (73)
Since |g2|2 has exponential distribution, M|g2|2 (b3γ) =
λg2
λg2+b3γ
, and by substituting (73) into (72), we can get (23).
Similarly, we can calculate the MGF of γ(2)e as
MTSR
γ
(2)
e
(z) = 1− z
∞ˆ
0
e−zqMΥ+c2+ζ (q) dq (74)
Since Υ and ‖g‖2 have exponential and chi-square distribu-
tions, respectively, the MGF of Υ + c2 + ζ can be given as
MΥ+c2+ζ (q) =
λΥ
λΥ + b2q︸ ︷︷ ︸
MΥ(q)
.e−zc2 .
2 (r q)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
r q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mζ(q)
. (75)
Now, substituting (75) into (74), we can get MTSR
γ
(2)
e
(z).
Finally, by substituting (74) and (23) into (70) we can find the
eavesdropper ergodic capacity of the proposed TSR system.
APPENDIX B
This appendix derives the destination and eavesdropper ergodic
capacities of the PSR-based system.
• Destination Ergodic Capacity
We first rewrite (37) in the following form
12
γd =
a1
|h2h1|2
‖h2‖2
b1 + c1 +
r1
‖h2‖2
=
X
b1 + c1+Y
(76)
while X = a1
|h2h1|2
‖h2‖2 and Y =
r1
‖h2‖2 , a1, b1, c1 and r1 are
defined in (43). Using (62), E
[
CPSRd
]
can be expressed as
E
[
CPSRd
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−MX (z))Mb1+c1+Y (z) dz
(77)
where MX (z) and Mb1+c1+Y (z) are given, respectively, by
MX (z) = λX
λX + (a1 ∗ z) (78)
and
Mb1+c1+Y (z) = e−(b1+c1)
2 (r1 z)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
r1 z) . (79)
• Eavesdropper Ergodic Capacity
Similarly, we can derive E
[
CPSRe
]
. First, we simplify γ(2)e to
γ(2)e =
|g3h1|2
‖g3‖2
b2
|g3h†2|2
‖g3‖2 + c2 + r2 +
ω
‖g3‖2
=
Φ
Υ + c2 + r2 + ϕ
(80)
when Φ = |g3h1|
2
‖g3‖2 , Υ = b2
|g3h†2|2
‖g3‖2 , ϕ =
ω
‖g3‖2 , and b2, c2, r2 and
ω are defined in (43). Again, we can get the ergodic eavesdropper
capacity by
E
[
CPSRe
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1−M
γ
(1)
e
(z)MPSR
γ
(2)
e
(z)
)
e−zdz
(81)
where M
γ
(1)
e
(z) is given by (23) and
MPSR
γ
(2)
e
(z) = 1− z
∞ˆ
0
MΥ+c2+r2+ϕ (q) e−zq dq (82)
where
MΥ+c2+r2+ϕ (q) =
λΥe
−q(c2+r2)
λΥ + (b2 ∗ q)
2 (ω q)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
ω q)
(83)
Now, substituting (23) and (82) into (81) yields E
[
CPSRe
]
.
APPENDIX C
Here we derive expressions for the destination and eavesdropper
ergodic capacities of the IRR-based system.
• Destination Ergodic Capacity
For convenience, we first rewrite (50) as
γd =
a1
|h2h1|2
‖h2‖2
b1 +
c1
‖h2‖2
=
X
b1 + Y
(84)
where X = a1
|h2h1|2
‖h2‖2 , Y =
c1
‖h2‖2 , a1, b1 and c1 are given in
(56). Using (62), we obtain
E
[
CIRRd
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−MX (z))Mb1+Y (z) dz (85)
where
MX (z) = λX
λX + (a1 ∗ z) (86)
and
Mb1+Y (z) = e−zb1
2 (c1 z)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
c1 z) . (87)
• Eavesdropper Ergodic Capacity
As for the ergodic capacity at eavesdropper, (51) can be simplified
as
γ(2)e =
|g3h1|2
‖g3‖2
b2
|g3h†2|2
‖g3‖2 + c2 +
r2
‖g3‖2
=
Φ
Υ + c2 + ζ
(88)
where Φ = |g3h1|
2
‖g3‖2 , Υ = b2
|g3h†2|2
‖g3‖2 , ζ =
r2
‖g3‖2 , b2, c2 and r2
are defined in (56). Given the definition in (62), we can express
E
[
CIRRe
]
as
E
[
CIRRe
]
=
1
2 ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(
1−Mγ(1) (z)MIRRγ(2)e (z)
)
e−zdz
(89)
where M
γ
(1)
e
is given by (23) and
MIRR
γ
(2)
e
(z) = 1− z
∞ˆ
0
e−zqMΥ+c2+ζ (q) dq (90)
and MΥ+c2+ζ (q) is given by
MΥ+c2+ζ (q) =
λΥe
−qc2
λΥ + (b2 ∗ q)
2 (r2 q)
N/2
Γ (N)
KN (2
√
r2 q) .
(91)
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